The Advanced Concepts Group at Sandia National Laboratory and the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes at Arizona State University convened a workshop in May 2006 to explore the potential policy implications of technologies that might enhance human cognitive abilities. The group's deliberations sought to identify core values and concerns raised by the prospect of cognitive enhancement. The workshop focused on the policy implications of various prospective cognitive enhancements and on the technologiesnanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science-that enable them.
The prospect of rapidly emerging technological capabilities to enhance human cognition makes urgent a daunting array of questions, tensions, ambitions, and concerns. The workshop elicited dilemmas and concerns in ten overlapping areas: science and democracy; equity and justice; freedom and control; intergenerational issues; ethics and competition; individual and community rights; speed and deliberations; ethical uncertainty; humanness; and sociocultural risk.
We identified four different perspectives to encompass the diverse issues related to emergence of cognitive enhancement technologies:
• Laissez-faire -emphasizes freedom of individuals to seek and employ enhancement technologies based on their own judgment; • Managed technological optimism -believes that while these technologies promise great benefits, such benefits cannot emerge without an active government role; • Managed technological skepticism -views that the quality of life arises more out of society's institutions than its technologies; and • Human Essentialism -starts with the notion of a human essence (whether Godgiven or evolutionary in origin) that should not be modified. While the perspectives differ significantly about both human nature and the role of government, each encompasses a belief in the value of transparency and reliable information that can allow public discussion and decisions about cognitive enhancement. The practical question is how to foster productive discussions in a society whose attention is notably fragmented and priorities notably diverse. The question of what to talk about remains central, as each of the four perspectives is concerned about different things. Perhaps the key issue for initial clarification as a condition for productive democratic discussion has to do with the intended goals of cognitive enhancement, and the mechanisms for allowing productive deliberation about these goals. Introduction
This report summarizes the findings of a workshop on policy approaches to the governance of human enhancement technologies, held at Arizona State University on May 3-5, 2006, and cosponsored by Sandia National Laboratories and ASU's Consortium for Science Policy and Outcomes. The idea for the workshop emerged from a conversation in the fall of 2005 among Gerry Yonas (Principal Scientist and Vice President, Sandia National Laboratories), James Canton (Chairman and CEO, Institute for Global Futures ), and Braden Allenby (Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Arizona State University). Allenby and Yonas had participated in a 2000, National Science Foundation-sponsored workshop on the societal implications of nanoscience and nanotechnology, and subsequently in a 2001 conference entitled, "Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Science [NBIC] ." Allenby had a long-standing interest in the societal implications of nanotechnology. All were aware that considerable work had been done on the ethical implications of human performance enhancement in general, and in the field of "neuroethics" in particular. Indeed, the prospect of a rapidly increasing technological capability to enhance human cognition has stimulated considerable activity in the U.S. and in Europe, including conferences, books, social science and humanities research, and even legislation.
This activity is perhaps surprising given the still-speculative nature of most of the technologies (and, therefore, of the social implications of those technologies). Nevertheless, such future-oriented discourse allows democratic societies to begin to prepare for the considerable challenges and opportunities that cognitive enhancement may create. Potentially, then, this speculative discourse offers an opportunity for anticipatory and adaptive governance of cognitive enhancement technologies, rather than yet another episode of after-the-fact response to more evolved technologies, which is typically characterized by divisive political debate and unsatisfactory regulatory regimes.
The workshop organizers thus decided to push discussions a step further and undertake an exploration of the potential policy implications of technologies that might enhance human cognitive capabilities. The group's deliberations sought to identify core values and concerns raised by the prospect of cognitive enhancement and to map out potential policy approaches. In particular, the workshop investigated how different political perspectives might give rise to alternative policy frameworks for the governance of enhancement technologies. The workshop thus aims at contributing to a foundation for public deliberation about the effective governance of technological capabilities that have the potential to transform society by transforming human cognition itself.
II. The Technologies
Nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science have been converging in several ways to enable cognitive enhancements. Nanotechnology is providing research instrumentation for improving knowledge of brain structure and function, as well as new means of drug delivery. Neurobiology is developing increased understanding of how brains and associated neural systems work. Information technology provides signal processing capabilities for neurobiological research and for interfaces among sensors, computers, brains, and prosthetic devices; it also enables modeling and simulation for computational neuroscience. Cognitive neuroscience has extended traditional cognitive psychology into the realm of understanding correlates between brain structure and function and cognition.
The workshop reported here focused on the policy implications of various prospective cognitive enhancements and on the technologies that might enable them, rather than on the details of the technologies themselves. Nevertheless, the workshop did review the technologies in order to establish a common baseline for discussion. Table 1 surveys the relevant technologies   Several caveats and comments about the table should be noted. • Most items have a corresponding suggested literature reference in the footnotes. These references are meant to be illustrative, and by no means exhaustive.
• The list is roughly in order of least invasive to most. But the way in which any particular technology was applied could obviously change its degree of invasiveness compared with any other technology.
• The technologies are in various stages of research and development. Some might well never turn out to have real cognitive enhancement applications.
• Similarly, the listed cognitive enhancement applications depend on varying degrees of speculation and projection (e.g., insertion of a gene that apparently makes mice "smarter" in some tasks may or may not be the harbinger of a genetic modification that results in higher-IQ humans.)
III. Values, Concerns, and Goals Implicated by Cognitive Enhancement Technologies
The prospect of rapidly emerging technological capabilities to enhance human cognition makes urgent a daunting array of questions, tensions, ambitions, and concerns. Some of these issues can be traced to dilemmas that have occupied thoughtful humans for millennia, while others are new and unfamiliar. Humans are unique among animals largely owing to their powers of cognition, so it is reasonable, perhaps obligatory, that the promise of modifying such powers should stimulate deep reflection and wide discussion. Moreover, the diversity of perspectives, aspirations, capabilities and values that people bring to such reflections guarantees strongly divergent views on what ought to be done. The huge uncertainties attendant with the types of sociocultural change that enhancement technologies might stimulate in turn make it very difficult to connect any particular set of views and actions with any particular future outcomes.
To a considerable extent, then, the question at hand is not how best to achieve or avoid a particular version of a cognitively enhanced human future, but how to engage in a process of reflection and action that gives society and its institutions the best opportunities to thrive. This challenge must begin through a consideration of the values, concerns, goals, and perspectives ("values and goals," hereafter) implicated by technologies for cognitive enhancement. The workshop elicited dilemmas and concerns in ten overlapping areas. 1. Science and Democracy. The tension between ideals of scientific autonomy and demands of democratic decision making is nothing new, but emerges with particular poignancy and urgency in the debate over enhanced cognition. On the side of scientific autonomy, the end point of this tension is that society and politics should place no restrictions whatsoever on cognitive enhancement research. The end point on the side of democracy is that participatory decision making processes are the source of appropriate choices about the types of enhancement that should or should not be pursued.
The standard argument for scientific autonomy is at once philosophical and practical. More knowledge, more facts, and, indeed, more truth, are inherently liberating because they enable more effective action in the world. The deeper one's understanding of how the world works, the more effectively one can control one's surroundings. As scientific understanding penetrates the sources of cognition, it will increasingly enable the control-enhancement-of cognitive function. While scientific knowledge may of course be misused, its inherent value is positive, because it enables factbased action that would not be possible without science. Moreover, because the detailed future paths of scientific and technological advance are unpredictable in detail, efforts to direct science along particular paths at the expense of scientific autonomy are inherently futile.
These arguments combine to form a strong political claim: that choices about what science to do and how to do it must be left largely to the scientists, and that efforts to slow or divert science from paths selected by scientists are usually misinformed and counterproductive. The a priori essence of these claims-deriving from the argument that human benefit is inherent in the progress of science-leads to the conclusion that opposition to research on human cognitive enhancement is rooted in irrational fears. Scientific autonomy must be protected, then, by insulating research from political interference, and by educating people so that they can escape from their irrationality.
Yet the force of arguments that support a scientific enterprise that is free to pursue cognitive enhancement without political fetters is countered by powerful arguments on behalf of democratic governance. Because cognitive enhancement could have profound effects on society and touch all citizens, all people have a potential interest in the consequences of cognitive enhancement. Therefore, everyone has a potentially legitimate voice in relevant decision-making processes. From this perspective, scientists are an important interest group, but in no way a uniquely privileged one. Moreover, because much cognitive enhancement research is supported by public monies, lines of political accountability run from science to the public.
The very unpredictability of consequences that is often invoked as a reason to protect scientific autonomy is an equally apt rationale in favor of stronger lines of democratic control: what advocates of cognitive enhancement research may portray as irrational fear can also be seen as differences in opinion about how an uncertain future might play out. Scientists and non-scientists, both, are ignorant about an uncertain future. Most scientific experts in cognitive enhancement are naturally going to focus on the potential benefits of the research because their own interests are advanced by the conduct of the research. Yet enthusiasm or hype voiced by experts for enhancement technologies that are at best speculative is no more or less inherently rational than fears based on speculation. Perhaps public discourse would benefit from a "Red Team" of technical experts whose job is to visualize problematic outcomes of the research, to create a level playing field for discussion about putative benefits and problems.
The ideals underlying the case for scientific autonomy are also in tension with the reality of democratic processes which, in fact, delegate decisions about distribution of scientific funds and organization of research to a wide range of agents, including elected officials, bureaucrats, and even the voting public. In other words, although the path of scientific advance may be unpredictable, in the real world it is nevertheless strongly influenced by choices made outside the laboratory.
There is no correct solution to the problem of balancing scientific autonomy and democratic accountability; the boundary will be continually negotiated and in constant flux. Because cognitive enhancement engages with the essence of human capabilities, it will appropriately remain a focus of democratic debate about the limits and prerogative of science for the foreseeable future.
2. Equity and Justice: Who will benefit from cognitive enhancement technologies? Presumably enhancements will be distributed largely through the marketplace; people will purchase desired capabilities. Will an uneven distribution of enhancements-which is presumably inevitableexacerbate and more deeply entrench existing social stratification and patterns of inequity by providing cognitive advantage to those who already have socioeconomic and political advantage?
Will the enhanced discriminate against the unenhanced, thus further entrenching inequity? Will those who choose to remain unenhanced similarly be the subject of discrimination, or of de facto coercion to become enhanced in order to avoid such discrimination? Will popular demands arise for enhancement to become a public "entitlement," so as to level the playing field? If so, might enhancement ultimately enhance equity and justice by enabling those who are cognitively disadvantaged to compete more effectively in the world?
Alternatively, might an enhanced minority be discriminated against by a fearful or envious unenhanced majority?
3. Freedom and Control: How strong is the individual right to make decisions about enhancing one's own cognition? Society currently regulates "cognitive liberty" by controlling access to, and in some cases prohibiting access to, psychoactive drugs. How will such lines be drawn as the diversity and magnitude of enhancement capabilities continues to increase?
4. Intergenerational Issues: Specific challenges in the domain of freedom and justice are intergenerational, and can raise novel ethical quandaries. Do parents have proxy rights to decide how to enhance their children? If germ-line engineering becomes feasible, should today's humans have the right to determine the desired attributes of future generations? Conversely, if today's humans choose to restrict or reduce enhancement of future generations, are they unjustly interfering in a future generation's right to maximize its capabilities?
5. Ethics and Competition: Different nations may adopt very different approaches to governing science, as is currently on display with embryonic stem cell research. Some democratic nations (for example, those with strong egalitarian commitments) might decide that the ethical challenges raised by cognitive enhancement warrant strict regulation; others (for example, those who favor growth over equality) may be more permissive. Authoritarian regimes dedicated to enhanced economic or geopolitical competitiveness might forego controls altogether in order to pursue global advantage. Just as individuals might feel effectively coerced into participating in cognitive enhancement to avoid discrimination, so might democratic nations decide, in the face of ethical compunctions, that they need to aggressively pursue enhancement technologies to maintain competitive position. The analogy with historical arms races is obvious.
6. Individual and Community Rights: Individual decisions to pursue desired outcomes (e.g., greater memory or intelligence) through cognitive enhancement, when made by many people, can lead to unintended or undesirable outcomes at the group or community level. (Traffic gridlock and air pollution are unintended and undesired outcomes of many people using automobiles to try to move quickly from one place to another.) No one knows what the outcomes of many people simultaneously pursuing enhanced intelligence, memory, or sensory acuity might be, but past experience suggests we should not expect that such enhancements at the individual level will automatically cumulate as enhancements of society as a whole, especially in the absence of simultaneous, political commitments to, say, equality and justice. Cognitive liberty, which is an individual right, is thus likely to be in tension with the rights of broader communities to pursue desired outcomes.
7. Speed and Deliberation: Rapid scientific advance is a de facto value underlying scientific research agendas. If cognitive enhancement is worth pursuing, then it is worth pursuing rapidly, and with bigger budgets. Those who see cognitive enhancement as a route to overcoming a variety of human imperfections, from medical disabilities to imperfect memory and the cognitive effects of aging, would also logically have an interest in seeing research on cognitive enhancement advance as rapidly as possible.
On the other hand, just as individual and community rights may be at odds, so may a commitment to speed be in tension with benefits that can arise from a slower advance of world-transforming technologies. Social institutions are often in a reactive mode when it comes to technology because the pace of technological change so often outstrips institutional response capabilities (rooted, as they are, in human decision processes). In particular, the types of trial-and-error or adaptive learning that may be necessary for wise governance of radical technological change is probably enhanced by slower, rather than faster, rates of innovation. The case for deliberation over cognitive enhancement may be particularly strong because the emerging technologies may have the capacity to alter the very human attributes around which most of society's institutions-political, cultural, even economichave been organized.
8. Ethical Uncertainty: Most of the foregoing dilemmas are also subject to ethical uncertainty created by the unknown future directions, pace, and outcomes of cognitive enhancement itself. To some considerable extent, this uncertainty can best be addressed by seeking to contextualize ethical claims made about enhancement. For example, ethical arguments based on the individual should be contextualized by including collective ethical implications as well. This is difficult enough; yet while most considerations of the implications of new technologies might reasonably assume that core ethical principles acting in society are more-or-less stable, this need not be the case with cognitive enhancement, since we simply do not know how changing human cognitive attributes might, in turn, lead to significant changes in ethical norms. How, for example, might the rights attached to notions of identity and self evolve as the cognitive underpinnings of identity and self are modified through technological intervention?
9. Humanness. Beliefs and opinions about cognitive enhancement are related to notions of humanness. Emerging technologies for enhancement can be portrayed as part of a historical effort by humans to extend their ability to act in and on the world, employing everything from agriculture to eyeglasses to organized education. From this perspective, enhancing human capabilities is itself part of the essence of humanness-I am, therefore I enhance. Other perspectives emphasize core attributes of humanness that persist throughout such historical changes, for example, continuity in the nature of ethical discourse, or in the emotional and intellectual sources of life satisfaction. One's sense of where humanness resides therefore has an obvious connection to one's values and beliefs about cognitive enhancement.
10. Sociocultural Risk: Optimists and pessimists alike seem to see in cognitive enhancement a capacity for rapid sociocultural change due to changes in human intelligence and performance capabilities. Workshop participants sketched scenarios ranging, on the optimistic side, from a world where the poor and malnourished, through enhancement technologies, were brought up to cognitive speed with the affluent world, to, on the pessimistic side, a world in which people became increasingly addicted to recreational activities enabled by the hybridization of enhancement technologies and virtual reality simulations. Similarly, highest risk was attributed by some to actions that might slow the advance of cognitive enhancement technologies, and by others to the opposite-unchecked advance. The larger, unstated, agreement was that broad and perhaps radical sociocultural change-of whatever character-was likely to be an outcome of accelerating advances in cognitive enhancement capabilities. Such change has, in the past, always been destabilizing to some groups, and beneficial to others. Regardless of one's views about the promise or peril of cognitive enhancement, then, there should be little disagreement that it is likely to raise continual challenges for appropriate institutional response.
IV. Four Perspectives on Cognitive Enhancement, and their Policy Implications
We identified four different perspectives to encompass the diverse issues related to the emergence of cognitive enhancement technologies:
• Laissez-faire: In this view, the emphasis is on the freedom of individuals to seek and employ enhancement technologies based on their own judgment of potential benefit. The economic marketplace is therefore the appropriate mechanism for developing and distributing the technologies.
• Managed technological optimism: From this perspective, human enhancement technologies promise great benefits to individuals and to society, but such benefits cannot emerge without an active government role to promote innovation, ensure efficacy and fairness, and manage risk.
• Managed technological skepticism: According to this standpoint, quality of life arises more out of a society's institutions than its technologies. Markets are viewed as profit-maximizing, not quality-of-life maximizing. The role of government is to enable the more effective pursuit of social goals such as equity and justice, rather than to promote technological advance as a proxy for such goals.
• Human essentialism: This perspective starts with the notion of a human essence (whether God-given or evolutionary in origin) that should not be modified, either for religious reasons, or because it might destabilize both individual quality of life and social relations in unforeseeable ways. The role of government, then, is to restrict enhancement research and its application when it threatens essential human qualities.
Each of these perspectives encompasses a distinctive combination of values and desirable policy interventions that were investigated during the workshop.
Laissez-Faire
Values: Those with this perspective believe in the primacy of individual choice, mediated through the economic marketplace. Responsibility and accountability are primarily vested in the individual, not in the government. Research and innovation are viewed as powerful forces for human good because they are expressions of individual creativity, and because they expand the realm of choice available to individuals. The marketplace is also seen as a powerful catalyst for innovation that, when combined with the potential of human enhancement technologies, could lead to the radical diversification of humanity-and consequent increase in freedom of choice and expression. Economic competition combined with cognitive enhancement competition should push human performance and capabilities to new heights. Economies of scale, and trickle-down of economic benefits, will help to ensure that benefits are not unacceptably concentrated among small groups. Transparency, in the form of easily available information about cognitive enhancement, will facilitate the efficiency and equity-serving behavior of the market.
Policies: Needless to say, appropriate policies for advancing this perspective should enable innovation and choice. One place where national government can play a positive role in is ensuring a level playing field for market competition, for example by monitoring the activities of other governments for inappropriate subsidies, and by ensuring that policy tools such as intellectual property (IP) are not used in the private sector as a way of blocking innovation. Governments may also need to protect the level playing field for consumers, so that the already-enhanced do not act, through non-market means, to protect their status by preventing others from becoming enhanced.
The government should also create a clearinghouse on product information (including testing and consumer complaints) so that consumers can understand what is known about efficacy, risks, and benefits of particular technologies. Companies, in turn, should be shielded from liability if they withdraw products from the market after problems have been uncovered. Regulation of particular technologies is not out of the question, but only if evidence of harm to humans or the environment becomes clear.
Some areas of tension exist within this policy framework. In particular, laissez-faire advocates may differ on how active the role of government ought to be in funding research, in helping to ensure the safety of new technologies, and in providing information to help consumers make wise choices. Interventions such as IP protection, liability limits, and regulation of childhood applications of cognitive enhancement also raise dilemmas about appropriate government action.
Managed Technological Optimism
Values: At the core of this perspective is the Enlightenment commitment to knowledge and innovation as key sources of human progress. Yet this value is tempered by the recognition and acceptance of a continual tension between a desire to maximize individual expression and technological innovation, and an understanding that the common good is not automatically served through individual action governed only by the marketplace. Similarly, while this view is optimistic about the capacity of enhancement technologies to improve society, it is aware of potential problems that could emerge, for example, through the commoditization of human cognitive attributes, and the commercial incentives that will arise to define attributes as deficient or sub-normal so as to justify the use of enhancement technologies. Nevertheless, this viewpoint embodies a tolerance toward risk, which is seen as an unavoidable aspect of technological society.
Thus, managed optimism is committed to a notion of balance between private and public action, although preferring to err toward the private because of a belief that people should have access to a diversity of opportunities created by enhancement technologies. Yet because there is no perfect balance point, and because the tensions inherent in this perspective are neither fixed, nor resolvable, there is also a commitment to continued surveillance, inclusive dialogue, education, and flexible policy approaches that can respond to unpredictable opportunities and challenges. The combination of technological optimism and commitment to pluralistic discourse creates its own tensions, however, because there is no guarantee that democratically expressed preferences will always be technologically optimistic. Indeed, in the U.S., political and economic elites, rather than broadly expressed public sentiment, have played the critical role in ensuring policy regimes that strongly encourage technological innovation.
Policy: The role of government embodies the tensions at the core of this perspective. Regulation is viewed as a blunt and ineffective instrument of governance because the pace of technological change is too fast to be usefully subjected to rigid regulatory regimes. Yet government can appropriately act to maximize innovation through the support of R&D, the design of more effective IP regimes, participation in international governance agreements, etc. Government also has a responsibility to foster the intelligence gathering and public discourse that can help inform democratic decisionmaking processes related to cognitive enhancement.
Crucially, however, from this perspective the governance of cognitive enhancement technology does not lie strictly in the domain of formal government policy-making but emerges from the interactions among governments, business, and NGOs, and the disseminated decision processes that emerge from such interactions. Because prescriptive policies are generally not sufficiently agile to deal with rapid technological change, this optimistic approach looks instead to a discourse of diverse voices and perspectives to be continually negotiating how society addresses the opportunities and challenges created by cognitive enhancement. Process-especially reflexive, democratic discourse-that is more important than any particular policy framework or prescription. Thus, as suggested already, one clear role for government is to ensure that discourse is inclusive, especially of groups that are typically marginalized in discussions about technological change.
Managed Technological Skepticism
Values: This perspective shares with the optimistic view the centrality of an Enlightenment commitment to truth and pluralistic, democratic discourse, and the recognition of a dynamic tension between individual and group motives and outcomes. Yet its differences from the optimistic position are not simply a matter of degree. The skeptical view is that technology is not inherently beneficial. For example, it is not clear to the skeptics that enhancing IQ is necessarily a route to a better society; smarter people may or may not be wiser. Overall, techno-hype is viewed as ignoring the root causes of social problems. From this perspective, efficient paths to addressing social problems should focus on the institutional and policy frameworks within which technologies are deployed, rather than on technologies themselves. For example, reducing the number of people without health insurance is seen as a better route to improved human performance than pursuing cognitive enhancements. Skeptics prefer to err on the side of regulation and restraint in order to minimize risks and give institutions the space to understand, adapt to, and if necessary reject technologies based on democratic discourses. Skeptics are therefore committed to a clear understanding of why technologies are being developed, what their likely (even if unpredictable) impacts are, and who is set to benefit from them in the short term and longer term, and who is not. (In this sense, the pessimists are more committed to the Enlightenment value of instrumental rationality than the optimists.) Such insights require a diversity of expert voices, so another commitment of the skeptical position is to a broader construction of what counts as legitimate expertise in discussions about technology. Sharing with the optimists the view that technological discourses are currently dominated by socio-political elites, skeptics in contrast believe that current decision processes are likely to preferentially benefit those elites and lead to undesirable commodification of cognitive attributes and amplified stratification of society.
Policies: While skeptics and optimists agree on the need to ensure that democratic discourse is linked to the governance of emerging enhancement technologies, skeptics are also more willing to entertain particular policy interventions. From this perspective, the potential for cognitive enhancement technologies to significantly transform society merits serious consideration of a range of policies, such as:
• A multi-year period of national public reflection and discussion on cognitive enhancement prior to making new or increased R&D commitments; • Creation of a permanent program to research the social implications of cognitive enhancement; • Creation of an independent analytical body, perhaps analogous to the former Office of Technology Assessment, to provide detailed, expert social impacts assessments of the full range of potential cognitive enhancement technologies; • Reduced funding for cognitive enhancement research with direct military applications;
• Stronger regulation and oversight of human subjects research on cognitive enhancement; • Stronger independent oversight of FDA phase II and III clinical trials; strengthening of phase IV postings on side effects; • Requiring that applicants for federal funding of cognitive enhancement research include a) a serious analysis of potential risks and downsides; and b) an analytically grounded basis for any claims of social benefits; and • Development of international governance agreements to prevent exploitation of developing countries or international cognitive stratification that could further impede development of poor countries.
Human Essentialism
Values: Notions of human dignity and a coherent, if not easily definable, human essence lie at the core of this perspective. Cognitive enhancement is therefore deeply problematic to the extent that it threatens either that dignity or that essence. Whereas the values motivating the three previous groups are all understood to reflect the contexts of modern, democratic societies, the claim of the essentialists is that their motivating values inhere in humanity itself, and are therefore more fundamental, and more deserving of protection. The other three perspectives also, to varying degree, look to the protection of individual rights as a source of democratic legitimacy, whereas essentialism looks to the protection of notions of the whole.
Essentialism draws from two different political and cultural traditions that are by no means easily reconcilable: cultural conservatives, especially in the U.S., and social liberals, particularly in Europe. God-given human nature lies at the core of the cultural conservative version of essentialism; culturally constructed human dignity is the social liberal version. Together, essentialism comprises five key dimensions:
• Species boundaries should not be violated; neither should the boundary between human and artificial be breached; • Limits are a part of existence; accepting limits to human power and control is a virtue that honors reality; • Humans are made in God's image (or, humans are a product of nature); modifying human nature thus violates God's (or nature's) design; • The collective good-the family, the community-is a better measure of human welfare than individual autonomy. Thus, the efficient operation of the marketplace is not a proxy for human welfare; and • Intangible and aesthetic values-beauty, appropriateness, repugnance ("yuk factor")-are valid reflections of essential human sensibilities and thus valid bases for critique of technologies.
Policies: Protection of human dignity could be enshrined in the U.S. through a constitutional amendment, although this would present admittedly huge definitional challenges. Part of the essentialist policy agenda would be to develop a process that drew lines between appropriate and unacceptable enhancement technologies. Chimeras and cyborgs are both definitionally clear and should be banned. Prosthetic devices that were wired directly to the brain might not be acceptable; if they were used to enhance normal functioning (rather than restore sub-normal functioning) they would clearly be unacceptable. Overall, cognitive enhancement technologies used as therapy to the sick and disabled would be regulated more generously than those used to enhance normal function. Traditional risk-benefit frameworks for regulation would be inappropriate. Other specific policies for discouraging inappropriate enhancement would include robust funding (including tax incentives) for public education on the risks of enhancement; a strong preference for research on nano-and info-technologies at the expense of biotechnologies; putting non-scientists with essentialist viewpoints on committees making decisions about funding for research on cognitive enhancement; prohibiting the recognition of IP for enhancement technologies in other countries; and an international agreement with like-minded nations to prohibit entry or emigration of enhanced citizens from other nations. Taxes and subsidies would be used to combat any economic competitive advantage gained by countries that did practice cognitive enhancements deemed unacceptable from the essentialist perspective.
V. Option Spaces
A simplified, but perhaps still useful, way to think about how the four perspectives presented above relate to one another is shown on the graph below. The horizontal axis represents a spectrum of beliefs about the stability of human nature itself, ranging from humanness as a culturally and technologically contingent concept on the left, and notions of a fixed human essence on the right. The vertical axis represents the level of commitment to prescriptive intervention, with a weak commitment at the top, and strong at the bottom.
The value of this sort of graphic portrayal is purely qualitative; it offers some mild cognitive enhancement for conceptualizing how a variety of perspectives on technological cognitive enhancement relate to each other. One immediate conclusion to be drawn is that the philosophical and operational dispersion displayed by the four approaches cannot easily be reconciled. No apparent option space for policy intervention emerges.
There is, however, another dimension across which the four perspectives have some significant commonality. Each group professes a belief in the value of transparency and reliable information that can allow informed public discussion and decisions about cognitive enhancement-although the laissez-faire and essentialist positions tend to couch it as "education," and the optimists and skeptics term it "democratization." Of course, each perspective holds this belief in the confidence that the resulting discussions will favor its own goals. For example, on the laissez-faire end, that better information will allow the market to more efficiently advance the technologies; and on the essentialist end, that more public discussion will result in a moral convergence toward the essentialist view opposing cognitive enhancement. Nevertheless, it seems to be a shared article of faith that more, and better informed, information flow and discussion is a good thing, and this creates a significant potential option space-an opportunity for action that can strengthen democratic process and clarify alternative paths for cognitive enhancement-perhaps opening up new paths and choices that allow for a better reconciliation of diverse perspectives.
Moreover, from a more disinterested, analytical perspective, the immense (if as yet ill-defined) opportunities and challenges offered by cognitive enhancement demand the engagement of as wide a variety of serious, informed perspectives as possible. It's not simply that the problem is too important to be left up to the experts, its that we have no idea what expertise is going to be relevant. The practical question, then, is how to foster productive discussions in a society whose attention is notably fragmented and priorities are notably diverse. A wide variety of existing mechanisms were mentioned at the workshop, from e-mail list-serves, chat-rooms and blogs to "science cafes," town meetings, and other face-to-face venues. One conclusion-represented by the workshop itself-is that the level of dispersed, democratic discourse surrounding cognitive enhancement is much more energetic and thoughtful, at a much earlier stage of technological development, than has been the case for other contended technologies in the past. All four perspectives would likely see this as a good thing (although the Laissez-faire group would be less supportive than the other three).
Yet the question of what to talk about remains central. To some considerable extent, the four perspectives summarized above are talking, and worried, about different things. The laissez-faire perspective is most concerned with protecting personal autonomy and market efficiency; the optimistic, with maximizing technological advance; the skeptical, with improving social policies; and the essentialist, with maintaining a core set of values. The ways in which cognitive enhancement technologies might intersect with each of these perspectives is far from clear. Thus, perhaps the key issue for initial clarification as a condition for productive democratic discussion has to do with the intended goals of cognitive enhancement. Indeed, theories, methods and protocols for combining pluralistic democratic discourse with complex processes of technological innovation have been proposed from a number of academic perspectives (see "For Further Reading," below), and are actually now being tested in the field of nanotechnology, for example with the NanoNed program at the University of Twente in the Netherlands (http://www.nanoandsociety.com/projects/nanoned.htm), and at the Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University in the U.S. (http://www.cns.asu.edu). Approaches such as Constructive Technology Assessment and Real-Time Technology Assessment treat technological innovation as a socially embedded process that is always subject to human deliberative decisions, rather than as an isolated activity to which society can only respond after-thefact. These approaches aim to build adaptive and iterative governance capabilities into the innovation process itself. While still in their relative infancy, they may offer a framework for encountering the diversity of political perspectives, and complexity of innovation processes and outcomes, presented by the emerging technological capacity for human cognitive enhancement.
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JAMES HUGHES
TOM KARAS, the workshop coordinator, has been at Sandia National Labs since 1996, and with the ACG since its beginning in 1999. Major topics he has worked on include a survey of "futurology," bioterrorism (emphasizing public health surveillance), the aging of the population, approaches to the war on terrorism, and border security, energy policy, and, most recently the organization of this workshop. Before joining the ACG, he worked in a Sandia systems analysis center. His first project there was a study of Sandia R&D in the context of U.S. national R&D policy. He then shifted into the Arms Control Studies department where he did studies on nuclear-test-ban-related issues, deterrence, START issues, and the concept of "de-alerting" strategic forces. He also managed a contract with some well-placed Muscovites for a study on "strategic stability." Previously, he spent 13 years with the U.S. Congress's Office of Technology Assessment (shut down at the end of '95), where he directed or participated in projects that included one on civilian space policy, two on anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile defenses (spanning four years), one on arms control verification, one on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and, finally (and incompletely) one on countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. CORY DILLON is an organizational consultant with a background in leadership development and talent management. She has more than 25 years' experience in strategic planning, group facilitation, and primary and secondary market research. Cory provides organization and support for CNS activities, programs, and projects, including "back office" functions, and represents CNS at ASU and in the community. As the unit matures she will coordinate marketing, including CNS web site and other media outreach strategy; research and analysis; report and proposal writing; and fundraising and special events. Cory earned a BS in Business Administration and a master's in healthcare administration, both from Ohio State, and a master's in pastoral studies, emphasizing organizational development, from Loyola University of New Orleans. managing the websites; and helping to organize workshops and conferences. In the fall of 2006 she will begin the Masters of Public Health program at the University of Minnesota , where she will major in Epidemiology. In general, she is interested in the influence of a multitude of factors (political, socio-economic, cultural, geographical, behavioral, etc…) on achieving health goals locally, nation-wide and globally. Her research interests include infectious disease, global health, public health trends, disease prevention, inequities in health, and health policy.
LORI HIDINGER

ACG WORKSHOP ORGANIZER
SUMMER JEROMIN supports and coordinates the Sandia Advanced Concepts Group Fests (workshops), assists with the ACG's newsletter, and is a member of the ACG team working on science and technology education issues. She holds degrees from Wheaton College (IL) and St. John's College (NM) and has several years of experience as a secondary English teacher at North Hills Classical Academy (Grand Rapids, MI).
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